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BAIL REFORM:
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR PRETRIAL DETENTION AND RELEASE
Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson
March 13, 2017

ABSTRACT
Our current pretrial system imposes high costs on both the people who are detained
pretrial and the taxpayers who foot the bill. These costs have prompted a surge of bail reform
around the country. Reformers seek to reduce pretrial detention rates, as well as racial and socioeconomic disparities in the pretrial system, while simultaneously improving appearance rates and
reducing pretrial crime. The current state of pretrial practice suggests that there is ample room
for improvement. Bail hearings are often cursory, with no defense counsel present. Money-bail
practices lead to high rates of detention even among misdemeanor defendants and those who pose
no serious risk of crime or flight. Infrequent evaluation means that the judges and magistrates who
set bail have little information about how their bail-setting practices affect detention, appearance
and crime rates. Practical and low-cost interventions, such as court reminder systems, are underutilized. To promote lasting reform, this chapter identifies pretrial strategies that are both within
the state’s authority and supported by empirical research. These interventions should be designed
with input from stakeholders, and carefully evaluated to ensure that the desired improvements are
achieved.
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INTRODUCTION
The scope of pretrial detention in the United States is vast. Pretrial detainees account for
two-thirds of jail inmates and 95% of the growth in the jail population over the last twenty years.1
There are eleven million jail admissions annually; on any given day, local jails house almost half
a million people who are awaiting trial.2 The U.S. pretrial detention rate, compared to the total
population, is higher than in any European or Asian country.3
Pretrial detention has profound costs. In fiscal terms, the total annual cost of pretrial jail
beds is estimated to be $14 billion, or 17% of total spending on corrections.4 At the individual
level, pretrial detention can result in the loss of employment, housing or child custody, in addition
to the loss of freedom. Pretrial detention also affects case outcomes. No fewer than five empirical
studies published in the last year, deploying quasi-experimental design, have shown that pretrial
detention causally increases a defendant’s chance of conviction, as well as the likely sentence
length.5 The increase in convictions is primarily an increase in guilty pleas among defendants who
otherwise would have had their charges dropped. The plea-inducing effect of detention undermines
the legitimacy of the criminal justice system itself—especially if some of those convicted are
innocent. Finally, two recent studies have found evidence that pretrial detention increases the
likelihood that a person will commit future crime.6 This may be because jail exposes defendants
to negative peer influence,7 or because it has a destabilizing effect on defendants’ lives.
Given the costs of pretrial detention, one might expect that detention decisions would be
made with care. This is not how the system currently operates. For the most part, whether a person
is detained pretrial depends solely on whether he can afford the bail amount set in his case.
Nationwide, nine out of ten of felony defendants who were detained pretrial in 2009 (the last year
for which the data is published) had bail set, and would have been released if they had posted it.8
Even at relatively low bail amounts, detention rates are high. In Philadelphia, between 2008 and
2013, 40% of defendants with bail set at $500 remained jailed pretrial.9 Over the same time period
1

Todd D. Minton & Zhen Zeng, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Jail Inmates at Midyear 2014, at 1 (2015).
Id. at 3.
3
Roy Walmsey, World Pre-trial/Remand Imprisonment List 2-6 (Int’l Centre for Prison Studies, 2013).
4
Pretrial Justice: How Much does it cost?, 2 (Pretrial Justice Inst. 2017); Melissa S. Kearney et al., Ten Economic Facts about
Crime and Incarceration in the United States, THE HAMILTON PROJECT 13 (May 2014).
5
Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal Yang, The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and
Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22511, 2016),
www.nber.org/papers/w22511; Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence
from Judge Randomization 22 (Columbia Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 531, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2774453; Paul
Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L.
REV. 711 (forthcoming 2017); Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact of Pretrial Detention on Case Outcomes:
Evidence from NYC Arraignments 34-35 (Working Paper, July 20, 2016), http://home.uchicago.edu/~npope/pretrial_paper.pdf;
Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes (January 12, 2016) (working paper),
https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/mstevens/workingpapers/Distortion-of-Justice-December-2016.pdf.
6
Gupta et al, supra; Heaton et al, supra. Stevenson and Dobbie et al tested for future-crime effects but found none.
7
Patrick Bayer et al., Building Criminal Capital Behind Bars: Peer Effects in Juvenile Corrections, QUARTERLY J. ECON. 105,
105 (2009); Megan Stevenson Breaking Bad: Social Influence and the Path to Criminality in Juvenile Jails, Unpublished
Manuscript (2015) at 1.
8
Brian A. Reaves, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2009 - Statistical Tables 1, 15
(2013).
9
Stevenson, supra note 5, at 12.
2
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in Houston, more than half of all misdemeanor defendants were detained pending trial; their
average bail amount was $2,786.10 Some pretrial detainees are facing very serious charges, but
most are not: At least as of 2002, 65% of pretrial detainees were held on non-violent charges only,
and 20% were charged with minor public-order offenses.11 The hearings at which bail is set—and
which have such serious consequences—are typically rapid and informal.
In the last few years, the hefty costs of pretrial detention have generated growing interest
in bail reform. Jurisdictions around the country are now rewriting their pretrial law and policy.
They aspire to reduce pretrial detention rates, as well as socio-economic disparities in the pretrial
system, without increasing rates of non-appearance or pretrial crime. The overarching reform
vision is to shift from the “resource-based” system of money bail to a “risk-based” system, in
which pretrial interventions are tied to risk rather than wealth.12 To accomplish this, jurisdictions
are implementing actuarial risk assessment and reducing the use of money bail as a mediator of
release. The idea is that defendants who pose little statistical risk of failing to appear or committing
pretrial crime can be released without bail or onerous conditions. Riskier defendants can be
released under supervision, and detention can be reserved for those so likely to flee or commit
serious harm that the risk cannot be managed in any less intrusive way.
This chapter offers a critical discussion of central pretrial reform initiatives, drawing on
recent scholarship. We hope to provide readers with a deeper understanding of ongoing academic
and policy debates around key reform goals: reducing the use of money bail, reducing racial
disparities in pretrial detention, implementing actuarial risk assessment, rationalizing pretrial
detention, and tailoring conditions of release. In each area we note the current direction of reform,
survey relevant scholarship, and offer our own perspective on the best prospects for effective and
lasting change. We evaluate pretrial reform initiatives on the basis of several criteria: efficacy in
promoting public safety and court appearance, intrusiveness to individual liberty, cost, and
distributive effects (effects on racial or socio-economic disparity).13 Part I provides background.
Part II is our substantive discussion. Part III identifies key reform priorities.

10

Heaton et al., supra note 4, Tbl. 1.
Doris S. James, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Profile of Jail Inmates, 2002 – B.J.S. Special Report, at 3 (July 2004).
12
See, e.g., Christopher Moraff, U.S. Cities Are Looking for Alternatives to Cash Bail, NEXT CITY (March 24, 2016); PRETRIAL
JUSTICE INSTITUTE, RATIONAL AND TRANSPARENT BAIL DECISION MAKING: MOVING FROM A CASH-BASED TO A RISK-BASED
PROCESS (2012).
13
For further guidance on bail reform, see ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE (3d ed. 2007)
[hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]; Moving Beyond Money: A Primer on Bail Reform (Harvard Law School, Criminal Justice Policy
Program; Oct. 2016); The Solution, Pretrial Justice Institute, http://www.pretrial.org/solutions; and Timothy R. Schnacke, Nat’l
Inst. Of Corr., Fundamentals of Bail: A Resource Guide for Pretrial Practitioners and a Framework for American Pretrial Reform
21-44 (2014). The general principles these sources articulate represent broadly held views among contemporary reformers,
policymakers and academics.
11
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I.

THE PRETRIAL SYSTEM
A. Structure and History

The pretrial phase begins when a judicial officer or grand jury determines that there is
probable cause to support a criminal charge, and it ends when the charge is adjudicated or
dismissed. Once the state has charged someone, it has a strong interest in ensuring the integrity of
the ensuing proceeding—including ensuring that the defendant appears in court and does not
interfere with witnesses or evidence. The state also has an interest, as it always does, in preventing
future crime, and some defendants may be particularly crime-prone. So the core goals of the
pretrial system are to (1) ensure defendants’ appearance, (2) prevent obstruction of justice, and (3)
prevent other pretrial crime, all while minimizing intrusions to defendants’ liberty.14
Since the Founding, the primary mechanism for ensuring defendants’ appearance has been
money bail, or a “secured financial bond.”15 A defendant deposits the specified bail amount with
the court as security for his appearance at future proceedings. If he does appear, the deposit is
returned at the conclusion of the case. This system has inspired three waves of reform. The first,
in the 1960s, sought to reduce the pretrial detention of the poor by limiting the use of money bail
in favor of unsecured release (“release on recognizance”).16 But rising crime during the 1970s and
1980s prompted a second reform movement, this time directed at incapacitating dangerous
defendants.17 The Bail Reform Act of 1984 authorized federal courts to order pretrial detention
without bail on the basis of a defendant’s dangerousness.18 Many states followed suit. Every
jurisdiction except New York also authorized courts to consider public safety in imposing bail or
other conditions of release.19 More recently, money bail has been on the rise and rates of release
on recognizance have declined.20 The current wave of reform seeks to reverse that trend.
B. Current Practice
In practice, bail hearings are a messy affair. Every person who is arrested is entitled to a
judicial determination, within forty-eight hours, that there is probable cause to believe she has
committed a crime.21 Many jurisdictions combine this with a bail hearing (or “pretrial release
hearing”). It is common for such hearings to last only a few minutes. They are often held over
14

ABA STANDARDS, supra, § 10-1.1.
See Schnacke, supra note 13, 21-40; cf. William Blackstone, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 296 (1807)
(explaining that an accused required to give bail must “put in securities for his appearance, to answer the charge against him”).
16
See, e.g., John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1, 2 (1985).
17
See generally Goldkamp, supra.
18
Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976-87 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-50, 3062).
19
Goldkamp, supra note 16, at 56 & n.57.
20
Thomas H. Cohen & Brian A. Reaves, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts 2
(2007) (from 1990-1994, 41% of pretrial releases were on recognizance and 24% were by cash bail; from 2002-2004, 23% of
releases were on recognizance and 42% were by cash bail); Reaves, supra note 8, at 15 (“Between 1990 and 2009, the percentage
of pretrial releases involving financial conditions rose from 37% to 61%.”).
21
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975); Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 58 (1991).
15
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videoconference, and often with no defense counsel present. The presiding official may be a
magistrate rather than a judge, and may not even be a lawyer. Available evidence suggests that the
bail judges do not often take the time to make a careful determination about what bail an arrestee
can realistically afford. Some jurisdictions use bail schedules that prescribe a set bail amount for
each offense.22 In others, statutory law directs bail judges to consider various factors in imposing
bail or alternative conditions of release.23 These statutes provide little guidance about how to weigh
the factors, or which conditions of release are appropriate to manage different pretrial risks.
In most cases a monetary bail amount is set, and in most cases the defendant need not pay
it directly to be released. Three mechanisms have developed for subsidizing bail. The dominant
one is the commercial bail bond industry.24 Commercial bail bondsmen charge defendants a nonrefundable fee—usually around ten percent of the total bail amount—for the service of posting the
bond. Because of concern about the effect of this industry on defendants’ incentive to appear and
on the fairness of the process, some jurisdictions have outlawed it. Others have developed their
own partial-deposit systems, which allow defendants to obtain release by depositing only a
percentage of the total bail amount with the court.25 The third, less common, mechanism is the
community bail fund: a non-profit organization that posts bail on defendants’ behalf.26
C. Law and Policy
The Supreme Court has affirmed that “[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention
prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”27 A panoply of federal
constitutional provisions protect pretrial liberty. Most importantly, perhaps, the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses prohibit the state from conditioning a person’s liberty on payment of an
amount that she cannot afford unless it has no other way to achieve an important state interest.28
Since 2015, a number of federal district courts have held that fixed money-bail schedules which

22
Pretrial Justice Institute, Pretrial Justice in America: A Survey of County Pretrial Release Policies, Practices and Outcomes
7 (2010) (reporting that 64% of surveyed counties use a bail schedule).
23
See, e.g., Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 837, 866 (2016)
(describing state statutes).
24
Cohen & Reaves, supra note 20, at 4 (showing that 48% of all pretrial releases studied were based on financial conditions,
most of which—33% of all releases—were on surety bond); About Us, AM. BAIL COALITION, www.americanbailcoalition.org
(last visited Jan. 31, 2017) (“The American Bail Coalition is a trade association made up of national bail insurance companies . . . .”).
25
E.g. Eric Helland and Alexander Tabarrok, The Fugitive: Evidence on Public versus Private Law Enforcement from Bail
Jumping, 47 J. L. & ECON. 93, 94 (2004).
26
See Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, __ MICH. L. REV. 101, 117 (forthcoming 2017) (noting that community bail funds
have proliferated recently, motivated by “beliefs regarding the overuse of pretrial detention”).
27
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
28
See, e.g., Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-73 (1983) (holding that to “deprive the probationer of his conditional
freedom simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine . . . would be contrary to the fundamental fairness
required by the Fourteenth Amendment”); see also Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, Varden v. City of Clanton, No.
2:15-cv-34-MHT-WC (M.D. Ala., Feb. 13, 2015) (“Incarcerating individuals solely because of their inability to pay for their
release . . . violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citing Tate, 401 U.S. at 398; Williams v. Illinois,
399 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1970); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961))). But see Brief for Amici Curiae Am. Bail Coalition et
al., Walker v. Calhoun, 16-10521 (11th Cir. June 21, 2016) (arguing that this line of caselaw has no application in the pretrial
context).
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do not take ability to pay into account violate these provisions.29 Relatedly, the Eighth Amendment
prohibits “excessive” bail.30 This requires an individualized bail determination: Bail must be
“reasonably calculated” to ensure the appearance of a particular defendant.31 The Bail Clause
permits detention without bail, but may prohibit any burden on a defendant’s liberty that is
excessive “in light of the perceived evil” it is designed to address.32 The Due Process Clause
prohibits pretrial punishment.33 It also requires that any detention regime be carefully tailored to
achieve the state’s interest and include robust procedural protections for the accused.34 The Sixth
Amendment, finally, requires that counsel be appointed for an indigent defendant at or soon after
her initial appearance in court.35 It remains an open question whether defendants have a Sixth
Amendment right to representation at the bail hearing itself.36
Beyond the federal Constitution, federal statutory law and state law regulate pretrial
practice. In the federal system, the Bail Reform Act lays out a comprehensive pretrial scheme.37
At the state level, there is wide variation in pretrial legal frameworks. Approximately half of state
constitutions include a right to release on bail in non-capital cases. The other half allow for
detention without bail in much broader circumstances.38 Most states also have statutes that
structure pretrial decision-making.
In the policy realm, the American Bar Association has codified standards on pretrial
release that represent the mainstream consensus among scholars about best practices in the pretrial
arena.39 Three core principles are worth highlighting. First, wealth cannot be the factor that
determines whether a defendant is released or detained pretrial.40 Secondly, money bail should be
set only to mitigate flight risk (not threats to public safety) and as a last resort.41 Finally, the state
should always use the least restrictive means available to mitigate flight or crime risk.42 Ultimately,
though, it is local implementation that truly shapes pretrial practice. There is huge variance across
counties with respect to the timing of bail hearings, the presence of counsel, the qualifications and
29

Order, Pierce v. City of Velda City, 4:15-cv-570-HEA (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2015); Jones v. City of Clanton, 2:15-cv-34-MHT
(M.D. Al. Sept. 14, 2015); Thompson v. Moss Point, Mississippi, 1:15-cv-00182-LG-RHW (S.D. Miss. Nov. 6, 2015); Walker v.
City of Calhoun, Georgia, No. 4:15-cv-170-HLM (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016). The Department of Justice took the same position under
the Obama Administration. See Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee and Urging Affirmance of the
Issue Addressed Herein at 3, Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 16-10521-HH (11th Cir. Aug. 18, 2016); Letter from Vanita Gupta,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., Dep’t of Justice, and Lisa Foster, Director, Office for Access to
Justice, to Colleagues 7 (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/832461/download.
30
U.S. Const. amend. VIII (“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required”).
31
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (emphasis added).
32
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754-55 (1987).
33
Id. at 748-52.
34
Id. at 747, 750-52. The Supreme Court upheld the federal pretrial detention regime against (inter alia) a procedural due
process challenge on the ground that it provided for an adversarial hearing, guaranteed defense representation, requirements that
the state prove “by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat” and that the court
provide “written findings of fact” and “reasons for a decision to detain,” as well as immediate appellate review. Id. at 751-52.
35
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 199, 212 (2008).
36
See id. at 212 n.15 (reserving judgment on that question).
37
18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-50, 3062.
38
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 4 CRIM. PROC. § 12.3(b) (3d ed.).
39
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 13.
40
Id. §§ 10-1.4(c)-(e), 10-5.3.
41
Id.
42
Id. § 10-5.2.
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training of bail judges, the resources allocated for bail hearings, the prevalence of commercial
bondsmen, the customary standards for bail-setting, and the availability of alternatives to detention
or money bail.
II.

PRETRIAL REFORM INITIATIVES
A. Reducing the Use of Money Bail

Reducing reliance on monetary bail is a central goal of many pretrial reform advocates.
The use of monetary bail, by definition, disadvantages the poor; defendants who have resources or
access to credit are more likely to secure release than those who do not. This fact is not only unjust.
It also means that money-bail systems that do not meaningfully account for defendants’ ability to
pay are inefficient at managing flight and crime risk, and likely to be unconstitutional.43 Although
implementing procedures to assess defendants’ ability to pay may help, it is difficult to assess
accurately.
It is possible to operate an effective pretrial system with minimal reliance on money bail.
The District of Columbia, for instance, has been running its pretrial system largely without it since
the 1960s. Nearly all D.C. defendants are released on recognizance or with non-monetary
conditions; a small percentage are ordered detained. For the last six years, appearance rates have
remained at or above 87% and rearrest rates at or below 12%—far better than national averages.44
Replicating the D.C. model is no easy feat, however. The District benefits from an
experienced and well-funded pretrial services agency. Without that infrastructure, limiting or
eliminating money bail is likely to reduce appearance rates as well. The best empirical research on
this topic found that money bail increased appearance rates by 3-7 percentage points over release
on recognizance.45 Increased rates of non-appearance can result in significant expense to the court
system and the police. These costs may be outweighed by the benefits of reduced money bail
(improved public safety, if release is based on crime risk; lower detention rates; and the elimination
of an unjust mechanism of release), but they are still important considerations. Reformers who
seek to limit money bail should pursue other methods to increase appearance rates, such as court
reminders.
B. Reducing Racial Disparities in Detention Rates

43

See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
See Pretrial Services Agency for the District of Columbia, Congressional Budget Justification and Performance Budget
Request Fiscal Year 2017, 1, 23 (Feb. 2016). Nationally, 16% of released defendants were rearrested and 17% missed a court date
in 2009, the last year for which data is published. Reaves, supra note 8, at 20-21.
45
Eric Helland and Alexander Tabarrok, The Fugitive: Evidence on Public versus Private Law Enforcement from Bail
Jumping, 47 J. L. & ECON. 93, 108 (2004) (using propensity-score matching system to evaluate data from the 75 largest U.S. urban
jurisdictions in the 1980s and 90s).
44
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The most recent available data shows that, in 2002, black defendants made up 43% of the
pretrial detainee population despite constituting only 13% of the total population.46 A second core
objective of pretrial reform is to reduce this racial disparity in pretrial detention. In order to pursue
this goal effectively, it is important to understand how such disparities arise.
First, arrest itself, as well as criminal history information, may reflect racially disparate
past practices. For example, residents of heavily policed minority neighborhoods are arrested for
drug offenses at disproportionately high rates relative to the rate of offending.47 Even superficially
colorblind methods of making pretrial custody decisions will embed these disparities. This is not
an easy problem to fix, as actual criminal behavior is unmeasurable and decision-making in
criminal justice has long relied on the criminal record as its proxy. Nonetheless, educating judges
about this type of disparity (or using sophisticated risk-assessment algorithms to adjust for it) may
ameliorate the problem.
Secondly, bail judges may harbor explicit or implicit racial bias, which is to say that they
may set higher bail or place more onerous conditions of release on minority defendants than
otherwise similar white defendants. A typical approach to measuring this type of bias is to see
whether minority defendants have higher bail than white defendants after controlling for variables
like charge type, criminal history and age. Using this approach, many studies have found evidence
of bias.48 As the number and specificity of controls increase, however, this measure of bias tends
to shrink or disappear. Baradaran and McIntyre find no evidence that judges set bail higher for
black defendants than white defendants once predicted crime-risk (a function of a defendant’s
specific charge and criminal history) is accounted for.49 Stevenson finds no evidence that bail is
systematically set higher or lower for black defendants in Philadelphia, conditional on the charge
and criminal record.50 While racial bias certainly exists, differential treatment of similarly situated
defendants on the basis of race does not appear to be a substantial contributor to racial disparities
in pretrial detention.
Third, racial disparities may result from differing levels of wealth or access to credit across
races. For example, Stevenson finds that, in Philadelphia, only 46% of black defendants with bail
set at $5000 (and who need only to pay a $500 deposit on order to be released) post bail, compared
to 56% of non-black defendants.51 Stevenson estimates that 50% of the race gap in detention rates
in Philadelphia is accounted for by differences in the likelihood of posting bail. The other 50% is
due to the fact that black defendants in this dataset are, on average, facing more serious charges,
have lengthier criminal records and accordingly have higher bail set.52 Similarly, Demuth finds
that black defendants do not have bail set at higher levels than white defendants, but finds that the
46

See Jail Inmates at Midyear, 2002, supra note 11, at 2.
See, e.g., Shima Baradaran and Frank McIntyre, Race, Prediction and Pretrial Detention, 10 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 741
(2013).
48
See, e.g., Marvin D. Free, Jr., Bail and Pretrial Release Decisions: An Assessment of the Racial Threat Perspective, 2 J. OF
ETHNICITY IN CRIM. JUST. 23, 31-33 (2004); Besiki Luka Kutateladze & Nancy R. Andiloro, PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE IN
NEW YORK COUNTY – TECHNICAL REPORT ii–iii (2014), www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/247227.pdf.
49
Baradaran and McIntyre, supra note 47.
50
Stevenson, supra note 5, at 23.
51
Id. at 4.
52
Id. at 25.
47
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odds of detention for blacks are almost twice as large because they are less likely to post bail.53 To
the extent that racial disparities in pretrial detention rates are a direct function of socioeconomic
disparity, reducing reliance on money bail should ameliorate them.
Finally, racial disparities in pretrial detention rates can arise from disparities in criminal
prosecution (charged offenses and past records, which in turn affect bail and release decisions)
that reflect actual differences in rates of criminal offending. It is extremely difficult to isolate this
source of disparity. But to the extent that differential crime rates contribute to racial disparities in
pretrial detention, the only long-term solution is to redress the underlying causes of the divergent
rates.
C. Improving Pretrial Process
Pretrial reform necessarily entails some changes to pretrial process. The following five
approaches hold particular promise.
Release Before the Bail Hearing
Jurisdictions can reduce the number of people who require a bail hearing in the first place
by increasing the use of citation rather than arrest, and by authorizing direct release from the police
station (stationhouse release).54 The process of arrest is obtrusive, time-consuming, expensive, and
potentially damaging to community-police relations. Jurisdictions including Philadelphia, New
York, New Orleans and Ferguson have recently begun substituting citations and summons for
arrest for some categories of crime.55 Even for crimes that require arrest, defendants who pose
little risk of flight or future crime should be identified rapidly and released. Risk assessment tools
may be helpful in identifying good candidates. Kentucky, for example, uses a risk assessment tool
to identify defendants who are eligible for station-house arrest.56
Slowing Down the Bail Hearing

53

Stephen Demuth, Racial and Ethnic Decisions in Pretrial Release and Outcomes, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 874, 894
(2003) (Demuth finds that Hispanics have higher bail set than whites, although that could be due to citizenship
status.)
54

See ABA STANDARDS §§ 10-1.3 (“Use of citations and summonses”); 10-2.1–10.3.3 (encouraging jurisdictions to employ
citations and summons broadly in lieu of arrest for minor offenses, and providing specific guidelines); Rachel Harmon, Why
Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. __, 2 (2017).
55
Chris Goldstein, Marijuana Arrests Down 73 Percent, PHILLY.COM (Aug. 7, 2015) (describing initiative encouraging citation
rather than arrest for marijuana possession); Bruce Eggler, New Orleans City Council Reclassifies Pot Possession, Prostitution to
Reduce Criminal Dockets, NOLA.COM (Dec. 17, 2010); Mary T. Phillips, Desk Appearance Tickets: Their Past, Present and Possible
Future (New York Crim. Just. Agency Research Brief No. 34, May 2014).
56
Order 2015-22, (Authorization for the Non-Financial Uniform Schedule of Bail Adminsitrative Release Program, S. Ct.
Ky., 2015)
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Currently, bail hearings in many jurisdictions are shockingly short: only a few minutes per
case. It is hard to imagine that two minutes are sufficient to effectively evaluate the risk of failure
to appear, risk of serious crime, whether detention or conditions of release are necessary, and, if
money bail is used, ability to pay. Taking more care during the bail hearing is likely to improve
the courts’ ability to evaluate risk and determine appropriate pretrial conditions. While slowing
down the bail hearing would, ceteris paribus, increase costs, a bail hearing should only be required
for defendants at risk of losing liberty. If more people charged with low-level offenses were
released before the bail hearing, the courts would have more time and resources to devote to
evaluating whether detention or conditions of release are necessary for the remaining defendants.
57

Providing Counsel
Decreasing the number of defendants who require a bail hearing would also lower the costs
of supplying defense counsel to those at risk of losing their liberty. Currently, many jurisdictions
do not provide counsel to indigent defendants at the bail hearing.58 Sixth Amendment doctrine
holds that defendants have the right to effective assistance of counsel at all “critical stages” of
criminal proceedings.59 The recent studies showing that pretrial detention substantially increases
a defendant’s likelihood of conviction and length of sentence support an argument that the bail
hearing is a “critical stage”.60 While providing counsel at the bail hearing would come at some
expense, the presence of counsel is also useful to the system as a whole: lawyers can provide
information that may help a judge determine which defendants can be safely released.
Furthermore, initiating defense representation at the bail hearing would facilitate early and more
effective investigation, plea negotiations, and case resolutions.
Information and Feedback
The judges and magistrates who set bail may not be fully aware of how their decisions
translate into detention rates. It may surprise some to learn how high detention rates can be even
at relatively low amounts of bail. For example, 40% of Philadelphia defendants with bail set at
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$500 – who need only pay a $50 deposit to secure their release – remain detained pretrial.61 While
it is conceivable that these detention rates are the result of well-considered policies, it is possible
that the magistrates are unaware of how difficult it can be for defendants to come up with even
relatively small sums of money. Increasing the flow of information and feedback to judges,
magistrates and policymakers may reduce the incidence of these seemingly irrational outcomes.
Court Reminders
There are many reasons why a defendant may not appear in court beyond willful flight
from justice. A defendant may not know when her court date is, have forgotten about it, or have
failed to make adequate preparations (such as arranging time off from work). For these defendants,
court reminders in the form of mail notifications, phone calls or automated text messages may
greatly increase appearance rates. The available research shows that phone-call reminders can
increase appearance rates by as much as 42%, and mail reminders can increase appearance rates
by as much as 33%.6263 Entrepreneurial technology firms now offer automated, individually
customized text-message reminders.64 While the efficacy of this type of reminder has not yet been
evaluated, it holds considerable promise. Finally, improving court websites so that defendants can
easily locate information relevant to their case should increase the likelihood of appearance. All
of these methods come at relatively low cost and offer potentially significant savings.
D. Implementing Actuarial Risk Assessment
Actuarial risk assessment is central to contemporary bail reform.65 Reformers aspire to
improve the accuracy and consistency of pretrial decision-making by assessing each defendant’s
statistical risk of non-appearance and rearrest in the pretrial period, and providing this assessment
to judges along with a recommendation for pretrial intervention. Pretrial risk assessment holds
great promise, but also raises cause for concern.
The Promise of Risk Assessment
There is reason to be optimistic about the actuarial turn in pretrial practice. Risk assessment
tools should reduce the subjective, irrational bias that distorts judicial decision-making. They may
61
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also mitigate judicial incentives to over-detain by absolving judges of personal responsibility for
“mistaken” release decisions.66 And recent studies argue that tying pretrial detention directly to
statistical risk can minimize detention rates while maximizing appearance rates, public safety, or
both. Analyzing a dataset from the seventy-five largest urban counties in the U.S., Baradaran and
McIntyre find that the counties could have released 25% more felony defendants pretrial and
reduced pretrial crime if detention decisions had been made on the basis of statistical risk.67 In
Philadelphia, Richard Berk and colleagues conclude that deferring to the detention
recommendations of a machine-learned algorithm in domestic violence (DV) cases could cut the
rearrest rate on serious DV charges (over two years) from 20% to 10%.68 Jon Kleinberg and
colleagues, working with New York City data, find that delegating detention decisions to a
machine-learned algorithm could “reduce crime by up to 24.8% with no change in jailing, or
reduce jail populations by 42.0% with no increase in crime,” while also reducing racial disparities
in detention.69
The strength of this evidence should not be overstated, however. All empirical work
comparing actuarial assessment to judicial pretrial decision-making has serious handicaps. One is
that algorithmic pretrial tools are developed on the basis of pretrial outcomes (e.g. rearrest, nonappearance) for defendants who were released in the past. It may be that the defendants who were
not released were categorically riskier. Without knowing how they would have behaved if released,
it is impossible to fully compare the algorithm’s performance to the judge’s.70 A second problem
with the claim that actuarial risk assessment is better at predicting rearrest and non-appearance
than judges is that judges’ predictions are not observed in the data; only detention status is
observed. Detention status does not necessarily reflect a judicial prediction, because judges
generally do not decide who to detain. They are charged instead with setting affordable bail that is
a sufficient incentive to achieve a range of objectives. Their predictions may affect the amount of
bail set, but whether a defendant winds up detained is also a function of his ability to pay (and how
accurately the judge has assessed it), his willingness to pay, and whether other circumstances (like
a detainer) prevent release. It is impossible to compare actuarial and judicial predictions when
judicial predictions are not observed. A randomized control trial (RCT) would help to evaluate the
utility of pretrial risk assessment, but has not yet been performed.
Concerns over Accuracy, Racial Equality, and Contestability
Pretrial risk assessment has also sparked controversy in the popular press. In 2016, news
outlet ProPublica published a study that claimed to have discovered that the COMPAS, a
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prominent risk assessment tool, was “biased against blacks.”71 It also opined that the COMPAS
was “remarkably unreliable in forecasting violent crime,” and only “somewhat more accurate than
a coin flip” in predicting pretrial rearrest generally.72 Finally, the article noted that statistical
generalization may be at odds with individualized justice, and that proprietary risk assessment
tools like the COMPAS pose transparency concerns. These critiques—regarding accuracy, racial
equality, and contestability—represent core concerns with actuarial assessment.
Debate about accuracy would benefit from an acknowledgement that no method of
prediction is one hundred percent accurate. It is particularly hard to predict low-frequency events
like violent crime. The ProPublica article concluded that the COMPAS was “remarkably
unreliable” on the basis that “[o]nly 20 percent of the people predicted to commit violent crimes
actually went on to do so [in a two-year window].”73 But that is much higher than the base rate.74
An algorithm that can identify people with a 20% chance of rearrest for violent crime provides
useful knowledge.75 The policy-relevant question is not whether a tool is “accurate,” but rather
what statistical information it provides, whether that information represents an improvement over
the status quo, and whether it can justifiably guide pretrial decision-making.
The concern for racial equality is similarly complex. The most obvious source of racial
bias in prediction would be if an algorithm treated race as an independently predictive factor, or
over-weighted factors that correlate with race, like zip code, relative to their predictive power.76
But none of the pretrial risk assessment tools in current use race as an input factor; the dominant
tool, the Public Safety Assessment, relies exclusively on criminal history information.77 Two
people of different races with the same criminal history will thus receive the same risk score.
Nonetheless, risk assessment can have disparate impact across racial groups. In fact, if the base
rate of the predicted outcome (e.g. rearrest) differs across racial groups, statistical risk assessment
necessarily will have disparate impact.78 This was the source of the disparity that ProPublica
documented: the black defendants in its dataset had higher arrest-risk profiles, on average, than
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the white.79 There is no easy way to prevent this result.80 Nor is it good reason to reject actuarial
risk assessment, because subjective risk assessment will have the same effect. It is possible to
modify an algorithm to equalize outcomes across racial groups, but usually requires treating
defendants with the same observable risk profiles differently on the basis of race.81
The third set of concerns with pretrial risk assessment are procedural. If people cannot
meaningfully contest the basis of their risk score, actuarial risk assessment might violate due
process by denying a meaningful opportunity to be heard.82 This problem arises with proprietary
algorithms like the COMPAS and with “black-box” machine-learned algorithms, although there
are ways to make machine-learned algorithms more transparent.83 A related concern is that no
algorithm will take account of every relevant fact about a given individual. For this reason, most
scholars believe that judges must retain discretion to vary from the recommendations of a risk
assessment tool, and jurisdictions have universally followed this practice.84
Best Practice in Risk Assessment
Given these concerns, and the limitations of existing research, jurisdictions implementing
pretrial risk assessment should keep a number of best practices in mind.
First, risk assessment tools should be intelligible to the people whose lives they affect: To
the greatest extent possible, the identity and weighting of risk factors should be public. Relatedly,
tools that rely on objective data are preferable to tools that include subjective components.
Second, stakeholders should take care in determining what risks to assess. At present, many
tools measure pretrial “failure,” a composite of flight- and crime-risk. But these two risks are
different in kind and call for different responses.85 As a number of studies have demonstrated, risk
assessment can attain greater accuracy—and produce more useful information—if it measures
them separately.86 Within each category, moreover, further divisions are warranted. For instance,
most tools currently define crime risk as the likelihood of arrest for anything at all, including minor
offenses. If society’s core concern is violent crime, then assessing the risk of any arrest is
counterproductive; people at highest risk for any arrest are not at highest risk of arrest for violent
crime in particular, and vice versa.87 Targeting those at highest risk for any arrest also introduces
unnecessary racial disparity in prediction, because arrest rates for low-level and drug offenses are
79
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skewed across racial groups vis-à-vis offending rates.88 Focusing on the risk of rearrest for violent
crime avoids these problems.
Third, criminal justice stakeholders should also take care to communicate accurately about
risk assessment. If a risk assessment tool measures the likelihood of arrest, it is inaccurate to say
that it measures the risk of “new criminal activity.” Risk assessment tools should be cautious in
the communication of risk assessments as well. Terms like “high-risk” embed a normative
evaluation.89 To avoid unduly influencing courts’ or stakeholders’ judgment about the significance
of a given statistical risk, an actuarial tool should report its assessment in numerical terms:
“Statistical analysis suggests that this defendant has an X% chance of Y event within Z time period
if released unconditionally.”90
Fourth, criminal justice stakeholders should confront the value judgments that a detention
regime guided by risk assessment will entail.91 Someone must decide what degree of statistical
risk justifies detention. Either the developers of risk assessment tools will make that judgment
implicitly, by choosing the “cut point” at which a risk is determined to be high and detention is
recommended, or stakeholders can make it and direct the design of the tool accordingly. Similarly,
any predictive system (including subjective risk assessment) will perpetuate underlying racial and
socio-economic disparities in the world, and stakeholders should determine how best to respond
to this reality.
Fifth, it is imperative that actuarial risk assessment tools are implemented carefully and
monitored closely, with rigorous data collection and analysis.
A. Rationalizing Pretrial Detention
A reform model in which defendants are detained based on risk rather than ability to post
bail requires that courts have authority to order pretrial detention directly. In states that still have
a broad constitutional right to pretrial release, bail reform may thus require amendment of the state
constitution.92 This poses significant logistical challenges and raises the difficult question of when
detention is warranted. In the 1970s and 80s, when the first preventive detention regimes were
implemented, critics argued that due process and the Excessive Bail Clause categorically prohibit
detention without bail.93 The Supreme Court rejected that position in United States v. Salerno.94
88
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But it did not specify what type or degree of risk is sufficient to justify detention, beyond the broad
principles that pretrial detention must not constitute punishment or be excessive in relation to its
goals. Even if the Constitution imposes little substantive constraint, the question of when pretrial
detention is justified is also a moral one.95
It is clear that some defendants should not be detained. To begin with, detention is not
justified if a less restrictive and cost-effective alternative would adequately mitigate whatever risk
a defendant presents. Samuel Wiseman suggests, for instance, that detention should rarely be
imposed as a response to flight risk, because electronic monitoring will nearly always reduce the
risk to a reasonable level.96 A related principle is that detention is unwarranted for defendants who
pose little risk of flight or committing pretrial crime. The great promise of risk assessment is to
identify this group and ensure their release. Finally, misdemeanor pretrial detention should be rare.
Defendants charged with misdemeanors generally do not pose a grave crime risk, and incentives
to abscond should be weakest in low-level cases. Some research suggests that misdemeanor
pretrial detention has lasting criminogenic effects,97 thus generating more crime than it prevents.98
Pretrial detention in misdemeanor cases also appears particularly likely to skew the fairness of the
adjudicative process,99 because a guilty plea often means going home.100 Scholars speculate that
this dynamic may be a major cause of wrongful convictions.101
Beyond these classes of defendants, there is no easy answer to the question of when pretrial
detention is warranted. Some scholars have suggested that it is justified when its benefits outweigh
its costs.102 Others have advocated for additional criteria,103 or community involvement in
95
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detention decisions.104 This important debate should continue. As a baseline, jurisdictions seeking
to craft new pretrial detention regimes should ensure that:
a) Pretrial release is the default, and detention is a “carefully limited exception.”105
b) Detention procedures include, at minimum, the protections noted by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Salerno (including an adversary hearing and right to immediate appeal).106
c) Detention requires clear and convincing evidence that (1) there is a substantial probability
the defendant will commit serious crime in the pretrial phase or abscond from justice, and
(2) no conditions of release can reduce the risk below that probability threshold.
Jurisdictions should specify what numerical probability qualifies as substantial and what
crime qualifies as serious for this purpose.
B. Implementing Non-Monetary Conditions of Release
In order to limit the use of money bail and reduce detention rates, bail reformers advocate
non-financial conditions of release as an alternative for defendants who pose some pretrial risk.
This section surveys the literature evaluating three common conditions: required meetings with
pretrial officers, drug testing, and electronic monitoring. The emphasis is on high-quality studies
such as randomized control trials (RCTs); evidence from the probation or parole context is
included if there is a lack of quality research in the pretrial context.
Meetings with a pretrial officer
The requirement of meeting periodically (in person or over the phone) with a pretrial officer
is one of the most common conditions of release. Pretrial supervision is an expensive intervention,
as it requires the time of a salaried employee of the state. It imposes time burdens on the defendant,
and, in increasing the requirements of release, increases the likelihood that the defendant will fail
to fulfill them.
There is no good evidence to support this practice. A small experiment conducted by John
Goldkamp, in which defendants were randomly assigned to low-supervision or high-supervision
conditions, finds no difference in appearance rates or rearrest across the two groups, either for low
risk or moderate-high risk defendants.107 An experiment in the 1980s randomly assigned
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defendants to either more intensive pretrial supervision or less intensive supervision plus access to
services (vocational training or drug/alcohol counseling). It found no difference in appearance rate
or rearrest across the groups.108 Very little other research exists. A correlational study funded by
the Laura and John Arnold Foundation showed that pretrial supervision is correlated with increased
appearance rates but is not generally correlated with reductions in new criminal activity.109 This
study was conducted across multiple jurisdictions that varied in their use of, and definition of,
pretrial supervision. Correlational studies are generally considered weak evidence, so it is hard to
draw firm conclusions from these results.
There are several well-executed studies on required meetings with supervising officers in
the probation and parole context. An RCT in Philadelphia that reduced the frequency of required
meeting with probation officers found no effect on new charges or re-incarceration.110 An RCT
evaluating the benefits of intensive probation (which, among other things, involves extra meetings
with probation officers) shows no evidence that these meetings decrease criminal behavior.111 The
intensive supervision does, however, increase the likelihood that a defendant will be reincarcerated due to a technical violation, at considerable cost to the state. Another study evaluating
the effects of abolishing post-release supervision showed similar results: a decreased likelihood of
re-incarceration due to technical violations, but little effect on crime.112
More high-quality research on the efficacy of pretrial supervision is needed. At the
moment, the practice is far from “evidence-based”, and the best available research shows no
benefits. Indeed, the arguments for why it might be effective are fairly tenuous. Supervision
implies a watchful eye and the guidance of a capable authority in troubling situations. Periodic
meetings with a pretrial officer are unlikely to serve these functions. If a defendant is engaging in
illicit behavior, she has every incentive to hide this from the pretrial officer, and the officer has no
knowledge of such activities beyond what the defendant chooses to share. There are thus scant
reasons to believe that meetings alone will have a deterrent effect or that the pretrial officer will
have the information necessary to intervene if troubles arrive. Given its expense and intrusiveness,
required check-ins with the pretrial officer should not be considered a core part of the portfolio of
pretrial options unless better evidence emerges to support its use.
Drug Testing
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The use of drug testing during the pretrial period has been shown to be ineffective at
reducing failure-to-appear rates or pretrial rearrest rates in a number of randomized control trials.
These studies mostly date from around the time when drug-testing was broadly implemented: in
the late 1980s and 1990s. A large RCT in Washington DC showed that defendants who were
assigned to drug testing were no less likely to have a pretrial arrest or non-appearance than those
who were randomly assigned to drug treatment or release without conditions.113 Another sizeable
RCT in Wisconsin and Maryland also found that drug testing had no benefit relative to release
without testing.114 Several other randomized trials showed similar results.115 Unfortunately, these
results have been ignored, and drug testing continues to be a mainstay condition of pretrial release.
The last decade has seen a surge of optimism about the benefits of drug testing in the
probation context. A famous study from Hawaii’s HOPE project showed that drug testing paired
with “swift, certain and fair” sanctions can effectively reduce drug use and re-incarceration for
people on probation.116 In this formulation, people receive immediate but light sanctions for each
failed drug test. Unfortunately, the successes of the HOPE program have proven difficult to
replicate. Multiple RCTs have found that drug-testing programs built on swift, certain and fair
principles are no more effective than status quo procedures.117
While not as obtrusive as electronic monitoring, drug testing poses burdens on the
defendant who must report for testing whenever notified. The state must pay the lab costs and the
salaries of the monitoring officers. Researchers may yet find the key to the effective
implementation of drug testing, but the best available evidence shows no indication that it is worth
the costs or intrusions.
Electronic Monitoring
There is limited high-quality research on the efficacy of electronic monitoring (EM) in
the pretrial period. However, there is growing evidence that electronic monitoring reduces
criminal activity for defendants in the probation or parole context. (The evidence is more mixed
on EM’s effect on technical violations or return to custody.) Electronic monitoring has been
found to reduce crime relative to traditional parole for gang members and sex offenders in
California118—although it increased the likelihood of returning to custody for gang members,
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due to an increased likelihood of technical violations.119 A study in Florida found that EM
reduced technical violation, reoffending and absconding relative to those placed on unmonitored
home arrest; a subsequent Florida study found the EM reduced probation revocation and
absconding relative to probation as usual.120 A high-quality study in Argentina finds that
electronic monitoring reduces recidivism relative to incarceration; other quasi-experimental
studies in Europe find that electronic monitoring decreases recidivism and welfare dependency
relative to incarceration.121 Additional high-quality research is important to assess the efficacy of
EM at preventing flight and pretrial crime in the U.S.
Whatever benefit EM provides comes at substantial cost. EM is a significant burden on a
person’s liberty. It places strain on family relationships, makes it difficult to find employment,
and can lead to shame and stigma.122 Surveys of people serving sentences find that EM is
considered only slightly less onerous than incarceration.123 EM is also costly to the state.
Purchasing the equipment, monitoring individuals, and responding to violations entails
considerable expense. Many jurisdictions charge fees for monitoring that burden the poor and
often cannot be paid.124 Once EM is available, finally, it may be overused. In one survey,
supervising officers believed (on average) that a third of the people they supervised on EM did
not need to be on EM because they posed no danger to society.125 In conclusion: EM should be
used selectively, and only as an alternative to detention.
III.

CONCLUSION

The pretrial system is ripe for reform. An optimal pretrial system will maximize appearance
rates while minimizing both intrusions to defendants’ liberty and pretrial crime. The central
principle that unites best practices in the pretrial arena is that any pretrial restraint on liberty should
be tailored to the specific risk a defendant presents, and should be the least restrictive means
available to reasonably reduce the risk. Given our existing knowledge about the operation of the
pretrial system and the efficacy of pretrial interventions, jurisdictions pursuing reform should
prioritize the following strategies.
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1. Improve pretrial process by granting immediate release for low-risk defendants and,
for others, providing a thorough hearing with defense counsel present before imposing
detention or conditions of release.
2. Provide defendants notice of upcoming court dates through phone calls or
automated text-message reminders. Make court websites easy to navigate.
3. Implement actuarial risk assessment cautiously and transparently, with continuous
evaluation by an independent third party. Assess and report flight risk and
dangerousness separately, and assess dangerousness in terms of risk of arrest for violent
crime rather than for any rearrest at all.
4. Detain defendants only if there is a substantial probability the defendant will
commit serious crime in the pretrial phase or abscond from justice, and less intrusive
methods such as electronic monitoring cannot adequately reduce that risk. Determine
what level of risk warrants detention in a transparent process.
5. Use conditions of release parsimoniously, since few have been demonstrated to be
effective and many involve non-trivial impositions on liberty.
6. Limit money bail as a condition of release to prevent detention on the basis of poverty.
7. Pursue further research on the efficacy of pretrial interventions. Pilot new pretrial
initiatives through randomized controlled trials in collaboration with an academic
partner, in order to rigorously measure their efficacy and identify necessary
improvements.
These strategies will of course require investment, financial and political. But they have the
potential to produce significant returns for defendants and taxpayers alike. If the momentum for
pretrial reform translates into action, we can inaugurate a more effective and more humane system
of pretrial justice.

21

